tation. The political character of this source of law suggests that the wording is secondary to the legislative purpose. A teleological approach to statute interpretation would inevitably lead to more or less corrective interpretation25, since it is difficult or even downright impossible to foresee all actual or possible cases where a statutory provision might be applicable.26 The law-makers will normally rely on the courts to adapt the statute’s wording and purport to complex and changing conditions. Nordling described the purpose of case law thus: Precedents complete statutory law by investigating the conditions for its practical application and by filling in what are deemed unintentional gaps.27While the generality of statutory provisions make them – at least potentially – applicable to many types of cases and conditions, it is up to the judiciary or civil servants to decide exactly how a statutory provision should be applied to a particular type of case. Even though the same legal enactment might be applicable to two very different types of cases, the application may vary a great deal. Surprisingly, Nordling argued forcefully against attributing absolute binding force to precedents.The principle of stare decisis was firmly rejected, since “the judge must have the freedom to follow or reject even established case law”28 Isolated cases carry even less weight.The basis of his argument could be found in Swedish procedural law:According to the Procedural Code of 173429, when trying a case, a judge shall ascertain the true meaning of the law.The significance of this provision is quite simply that a judge is prohibited from uncritically accepting the judgement of another judge, regardless of his or her position within the hierarchy of the courts.He or she must base his or her ruling on applicable Swedish law, the so called gällande rätt30, while precedents amount to no more than a supportive or an opposing argument – albeit an argument approved by colleagues. re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 302 25 Interpretation contra legem. 26 Nordling, ibidem. 27 Through analogous reasoning, see Nordling, ibidem, p 26. 28 Ibidem. 29 RB1:11. 30 The Swedish equivalent to the German concept of geltendes Recht, i e positive law fixed in one or more sources of law. For an insight into the history of this concept, see Sandström, Marie,The Concept of Legal Dogmatics Revisited, in Epistemology and Ontology (ed Bankowski), Stuttgart 2005, pp 133-140, cf Stahl, Friedrich Julius, Rechtswissenschaft oder Volksbewußtsein? Eine Beleuchtung des von Herrn Staat-
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