ciety’s legal convictions, the discrepancy will sooner, rather than later, spell its doom.21 Only under very primitive conditions can the popular sense of justice express itself adequately and predominately through customary law.22 In more developed societies customary law has to a large extent been superseded by statutory law, a more indirect expression of society’s changing values.The primacy of statutes doesn’t, however, make customary law completely superfluous.The unique quality of customary law – the strong link forged between customs and societal values – ensures its inclusions within the doctrine of legal sources. In fact, customary law supplements statutory law. Legislative bodies may, for instance, adopt a minimalist attitude to legislation thereby leaving broad scope for others sources of law to fill in the gaps.Moreover statutes are often given a highly abstract wording, which allows customary law to adapt the general rule to the conditions in a specific market or a particular region.23 Since the Nordic legal tradition has rejected the notion of a comprehensive codification, customary law and the historical arguments connected with it has, even in modern times, been given broad leeway. If customary law can be used to complement statute law – by filling in the blanks and adapting abstract norms to an ever-changing and heterogeneous society – case law plays a similar role within the doctrine of legal sources.The dogmatic quality of statutory law is at once both its strong point and its weakness: No other source of law can boast the same level of efficacy and promptness as statutory law.The legislative bodies are the principal interpreters of the will of the people.Yet, like any powerful tool, black letter law may be dangerous to wield. Nordling went so far as to admonish the Swedish parliament to take care when making and remaking statutes24, echoing the latin maxim, leges figendi et refigendi consuetude est periculosissima. By the same token, the legislator is prevented from regulating society in every detail, since statutes must contain more or less general rules and the application of law is left to courts and public authorities. It is furthermore clearly impossible to write statutes in a way that precludes the need for interpremar i e sand st röm 301 21 Ibidem. 22 Ibidem. 23 Ibidem, p.28. 24 Ibidem.
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