statutory interpretation. This, however, was already common knowledge in the nineteenth century. The first legal scholar to treat the problem of legislative history as a source of law was Carl GeorgWächter, who in the nineteenth century was also a member of theWürttemberg parliament. His argument was that laws have different fields of application: While it is the duty of citizens to obey laws, judges are obliged both to obey and interpret them. Citizens and judges have different functions. This point of view seems a little harsh, once again in considering the principle of legality, that laws applicable to citizens should also be comprehensible to citizens.On the other hand, one could interpretWächter’s argument as a typical expression of that famous theory of historical development,adopted by the historical school.Humanity passes through stages of development, which also applies to the function and place in society occupied by judges and lawyers, passing through these stages, moving towards an ever higher degree of specialisation.As conflicts in society become more complex, the methods of regulation become more so.This inevitably forces a rift between how citizens interpret the law and how lawyers do so - not because they are lawyers, but because the sources of law need people with special training to interpret them. This development explains whyWächter thought it absurd or at least foolish for any lawyer or judge, who had the task of applying the final product of the legislative machinery in a Court, not to use any document available which would provide information about the process of r i chard nordqu i st 209 24 C. G.Wächter, Württembergisches Privatrecht, bd. 2, 1838-40, p. 145. Noch entsteht die Frage, ob der Richter auch andere Hülfsmittel, als welche in der promulgirten Gesetzgebung selbst liegen, ob er z. B. die Quellen, aus welchen die Verfasser des Gesetzes schöpften,Verhandlungen, welche dem Gesetze vorangingen sc. zur wissenschaftlichen Auslegung benützen dürfe.Manche leugnen dies, weil den Unterthanen nichts binde, als was ihm Gesetz publicirt sey.Allein dieser Grund führt keineswegs auf unbedingteVerneinung des Satzes. Denn der Gesetzgeber wollte mit seinen Gesetzesworten seinen Sinn, den von ihmgewollten Inhalt des Gesetzes, publiciren und promulgirte ihn auch wirklich, wenn gleich oft in unklarer und mangelhafter Form.Von einer Promulgation der Mittel aber, diesen Sinn zu finden ... kan doch in der That nicht die Rede sein. Diese sich zu verschaffen, woher es sey, ist Sache dessen, der das Gesetz zu befolgen und anzuwenden hat.24
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=