tical and practical functions? Does not the introduction of such vague concepts allow for a relative jurisprudential openness, allowing or forcing them to adopt a view of legal science where it necessarily conforms to “reality”-be it actual practices, social demands or positive ideas of justice? Taking Lundstedt’s idea that legal science ultimately serves a constructive function in society into consideration it is therefore possible to point to the fact that a number of points of contact exist between the Uppsala School and traditional jurisprudence; points of contact that appear on a fundamental level, such as a susceptibility to the need of correspondence between law and society, regardless of whether the argument is labeled as “historical” or “social”. But, if it is the case that the Uppsala School and the older tradition are not wholly alien to each other, then one must ask what where the reasons for this correspondence? Is the Uppsala School’s conformity to tradition something brought about by tradition? Does it defer to and observe the generally exercised practice of regarding legal science as being almost identical to dogma? Or is it an issue of conviction, of opinion, namely that the Uppsala School follows the meta-rule of jurisprudence in prescribing that legal science must defer to practical needs or lose its status as a source of law? Or is it a matter of necessity, a theoretical or philosophical issue - namely, that the Uppsala School defers to convention on account of the conventional view’s positivistic premises, which is the basic postulate that corresponds best with the anti-metaphysics of the Uppsala School. In this article I imply that the correspondence to traditional ideas and dogmas is caused by a combination of these factors. Some ideas being accepted at face value, other accepted after careful critique and analysis and, many rejected. On the technical sources of law the Uppsala School does not challenge tradition. In fact, it accepts the traditional doctrine of sources at face value, the main issue of debate being the philosophical foundations to any aspiration of legal science to constitute a source of law. And it is in this respect that the Uppsala School disapproves of the general consciousness of law as a source of law in force independent of, and parallel to, the technical sources of law. Hence the Uppsala School’s view of legal science is perhaps best explained as a corollary to its own scientific postulates, which in turn force legal science to concur with the facts of life - that is, the reality – the social and practical context – in which the legal order operates But, in that case the waters may have been troubled, and after yet re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 176
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