If we speculate somewhat, Hägerström’s definition of positive law as a science makes the aims and purposes of jurisprudence practical per se and thus social rather than speculative.And it is perhaps here that we find an explanation of the correspondence between two rather different views of the nature of law and legal science. It is by assuming the perspective of the judge that jurisprudence becomes a practical science, which can be done only if jurisprudence delivers legally valid judgements, rather than philosophically valid propositions, regarding the application of positive law; judgements that provide the judge with the specific principles needed to help him decide a specific case. However, this must be done with a specific practical end kept in mind, namely that of providing the judge with a set of principles that will help him to decide a specific case, which in turn is an activity that is under pressure to uphold the interests of a superior (social) order.53 Strictly speaking this implies that jurisprudence must abandon formalism and turn to realism, that is, social reality.And one might even contend that the “empirical” approach and method of jurisprudence constitutes an argument for a more realistic - that is, practical - jurisprudence. It must be added that, perceived from a formalistic standpoint, the social view presented above is somewhat lacking in scientific stringency. For instance, Kelsen’s approach eliminates any suspicion that legal scientists and legal science confuse Sein und Sollen, thereby transgressing the strictures of the scientific mandate in the logical analysis of positive law.And with this observation kept in mind, Hägerström’s addenda of various social purposes of the law on the one hand, and a methodological openness on the other, taints a pure theory of law.54 Hägerström’s defence against any critique for diluting the purity off legal science is that the doctrines and principles of jurisprudence must supply judges with a working knowledge of the linguistic meaning of the law and insights into the spirit of the law, because such combined knowledge was the only thing capable of guiding judges in the proper administration of justice.55And legal knowledge, viewed from this perspective, was theoretical by nature; descriptive, and informing the judge max ly l e s 173 53 Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 62-63 and 85-86. 54 Cf. ibid.: pp. 86-89. 55 Ibid. 3.2. A traditionalist Interpretation
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