that of epistemological issues of law and suchlike, while “legal science or jurisprudence in a restricted sense, i.e. as distinguished from legal philosophy”42 deals with practical issues of law, which makes it necessary for jurisprudence to include “certain social evaluations” into its equations.43 However, this does not make jurisprudence, the practical aspect of legal science, scientifically independent of legal philosophy. On the contrary, jurisprudence still gains its scientific status from the epistemological principles laid down by legal philosophy,44 but its practical legal status or relevance is dictated by practical considerations - namely, the above-mentioned “social evaluations”. Lundstedt thus emphasizes the social aspect of law is emphasised (perhaps influenced by early 20th century German doctrine), and even applies the method of social utility (samhällsnyttemetoden) as the basis for law and its administration and application in various forms and discourses.45 The proper task of legal science, in addition to its theoretical foundations, is therefore practical. In fact, Lundstedt argued that legal science must functionconstructively with respect to social life.46 He defined this constructive task as one aimed at the benefit of society, which must also be the starting point for any legal activity – including those of jurisprudence. The task of functioning constructively with respect to society necessitates that legal science, jurisprudence, does the following: “takes up an evaluating position in regard” to the law in force as well as proposed legislation; interprets the law on an abstract level as well as its application in specific cases; and finally, that jurisprudence subjects the legal material to a formal systematization.47 His main argument being that if legal science wishes to further its practical aspects it must avoid distancing itself from the needs of society. It was thus imperative that jurisprudence works in harmony with the “benefit of society”. max ly l e s 171 42 Vilhelm Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised: MyViews on Law(Stockholm, 1956), p. 132. 43 Ibid., p. 131. 44 Ibid. 45 See Lundstedt, Grundlinjer II:2, pp. 68-75 and 79-92. 46 Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 131. Being well aware of the pejorative meaning connected to the term “constructive jurisprudence” Lundstedt adds the following disclaimer in a footnote:“The word ‘constructive’ has of course nothing to do with the ‘constructions’ of legal ideology. I use the word as referring to the contribution of jurisprudence to the construction of society.” 47 Ibid., p. 133.
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