sophy to policing the application and use of scientific methods and concepts, rather than providing legal science withphilosophically binding dogma.38This, one can argue, furthermore reinforced the practical objective of legal science, (as argued, for instance by Nordling et al.) while reinforcing the jurists’feelings of estrangement from philosophy.39 Such separation between law and philosophy is problematic to Hägerström, for while this separation emphasizes the practical purpose of legal science, it simultaneously threatens the scientific foundations of jurisprudence.And even if Hägerström concurs with the prevalent jurisprudential idea that legal science and legal philosophy must, at least for the sake of legal science, establish a division of labor, he still argues that there areas in jurisprudence where philosophy remains indispensable: As one of Hägerström’s close followers AndersVilhelm Lundstedt (18821955) developed Hägerström’s theory of legal science further, pointing to the need to make distinguish between its theoretical and practical aspects.41This distinction reserves the domain of “legal philosophy” to re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 170 38 Ibid., pp. 299-300. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Lundstedt’s ideas were developed under several decades but I have chosen to refer to his later works. “The representatives of the special sciences have long ago issued to philosophers the command ‘Hands off !’ But what induces a certain boldness in the philosophers, notwithstanding this command, is the fact that the notions which are used for describing what is actual may very well be delusive. If they disclose to analytic scrutiny a contradiction, they are notions only in appearance. In that case there is merely a concatenation of words without meaning. And the alleged fact, which is supposed to have a nature defined by the ‘notion’, would be no fact at all. Ever since Socrates’ time it has been held that one of the highest tasks of philosophy is to analyze notions which are in common use in order to attain a real world of scientific concepts, which must be internally coherent. For the reality, with which science is concerned, cannot be described by means of judgments which contradict each other. No doubt it is always possible to put such judgments into words, but these words have no meaning. Therefore no science which claims to describe reality can evade a conceptual analysis of this kind.”40 3.1.2. Legal Science as “juridik”and“samhällsnytta”
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=