fied several alternative views of legal science.Two were of particular interest. First was the idea that the legal system constituted an existing, all-encompassing and perfect structure of norms, which materially covered every possible case; a system that allowed every case to be explained materially with reference to the system itself (the theory of Karl Bergbohm, 1849-1929).28 Second came views such as Hans Kelsen’s (1881-1973) pure theory of law, which reduced positive law to legislation and restricted the domains of legal science to the literal interpretation of statute law (the code) and to anything that could be deduced, in the strict sense of the word, from the exegesis of the statutes.29The problems, according to Hägerström, were that such views tended to stray from that which was scientifically possible on the one hand, on the other, to be equitable, socially acceptable, and practical.30 According to Hägerström Bergbohm’s view of law and legal science the legal system is founded on the idea that this normative totality exists and acts as an autonomous entity capable of providing an all encompassing formal system of law in which a specific solution for every conceivable legal problem is preconceived.A theory that Hägerström finds scientifically unacceptable, since the facts necessary for the verification of the theory are mere fictions.31 The second alternative, Kelsen’s theory of legal science, entails that nothing but formal deductions from the rules of legislation are scientifically possible and permissible (a form of legal dogmatics that Hägerström in his earlier works as viable, but later rejected32). Even though based in facts (the law of the land) such theories were not unproblematic, but this time from a social rather than a purely philosophical perspective. A necessary consequence of Kelsen’s system is that it, due to its rigid demands for exactness creates a discrepancy between lawand social objectives, that is, the purpose and spirit of the same law.33 On the contrary, Hägerström argues, this activity must supplemented materially as well as formally: materially, by other sources of law than legisre cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 168 28 Axel Hägerström,Stat och rätt: en rättsfilosofisk undersökning: 1(Uppsala,1904), pp.2124; Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity, pp. 533-38. 29 Hägerström’s analysis:Axel Hägerström,“Kelsen’sTheory of Law and the State,” in Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals: Axel Hägerström, ed. Karl Olivecrona (Stockholm, 1953), pp. 257-98. 30 Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity, pp. 534-38, 50-51, 58-60. 31 See Ibid., pp. 533-38. 32 For Hägerström’s earlier idea of dogmatics and discussion on the subject see Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 1-16; Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity, pp. 439-41.
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