According to the monistic ontology and epistemology of the Uppsala School, as defined by inter aliaAxel Hägerström (1868-1939), the only possible context of reality is empirical by definition (for the empirical world is self-identical, therefore real).24 The Uppsala School’s general philosophy thus restricts the limits for every intelligible human activity pertaining to a non-metaphysical context and conception of reality. And any activity aspiring to have meaning (theoretically as well as practically) must therefore avoid making use of metaphysical ideas; for such metaphysical propositions are, owing to their lack of objective counterparts, contradictory, unreal, and meaningless.25 Applied in a legal context, legal practitioners as well as theorists ought to restrict their activities to the law of the land, which, epistemologically speaking, is the equivalent of restricting their findings and investigations to an empirical, non-metaphysical context.26 In short, Hägerström, in accordance with the anti-metaphysical basis of his philosophy on the one hand, and on the other the prevailing legal opinion of his day, restricted the number of positive sources of law to: legislation, customary law, judicial practice, and the doctrines of jurisprudence.27 In his analysis of the legal science of his day,Axel Hägerström identimax ly l e s 167 Hagerup,“Nogle ord om den nyere Retsvidenskabs Karakter,”Tidsskrift for Retsvidenskab (TfR) 1888: pp. 1-58. 24 See e.g. Konrad Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi (Uppsala, 1968), pp. 95-120; Max Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity:Axel Hägerström’s Critique of Legal Science (Stockholm, 2006), pp. 141-69 and 228-40. 25 Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity, pp. 641-57. 26 See e.g Axel Hägerström, “Naturrätt i straffrättsvetenskapen?,”Svensk Juristtidning (SvJt) (1920):passim;Hägerström, DieWissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen: Axel Hägerström, ed. Raymund Schmidt, vol. vii (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 1-5 and 67-77; Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring på privaträttens område,” inRätten och viljan: två uppsatser ånyo utg. av Karl Olivecrona, ed. Karl Olivecrona (Lund, 1961), pp. 99-100. 27 See e.g.Hägerström,Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp.16-25;Hägerström,“Till frågan om begreppet gällande rätt,” review of Theorie der Rechtsquellen (Alf Ross), Tidsskrift for Retsvidenskap (TfR) 1931: pp. 86-89; Hägerström, “En straffrättslig principundersökning,” Svensk Juristtidning (SvJt) 1939: p. 210; cf. Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 106-07 and 24-28. See also AndersVilhelm Lundstedt, Grundlinjer i skadeståndsrätten, vol. ii:2 (Uppsala, 1953), pp. 89-91; Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity, pp. 521-60. 3. th e up p sala school : s ourc e s of law 3.1. Axel Hägerström’s Notion of Legal Science
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=