of legal theory as law (that is, in its function of doctrine or dogma) is ultimately identical with the correspondence of doctrine with the general consciousness of law.Regardless of which, legal doctrine must answer to two challenges. On the one hand, doctrine must function formally – that is, interpret, elucidate, systematize, and turn positive law into a coherent and single system.And on the other hand, it must function materially, that is, indicate and determine positively the existence of any legal propositions that have not been formulated by any other source of law, to inform the legislature of any lacunas in the law, and define and determine the legal propositions (principles and concepts) themselves and the limits for the application of the law.20 But as a source of law, legal theory is subjected to restrictions from which the other sources of law are freed, and can thus not be said to possess a truly autonomous status as a source of law. The authority of doctrine is thus limited to its indirect influence over the content and outcome of legislation, court practice, the general consciousness of law, and legal customs. Legal science thus invites legislators, judges, and the people to harmonize their respective notions of law with the principles laid down by legal theory.22 However, if this is the positive task of legal science, then its practical scope must be defined as restricted, limiting legal science to function productively in a weak sense.23 Having described the general background for the discussion Inow turn to the Uppsala School and its theories of legal science. re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 166 20 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 21 Ibid., p. 29. (My translation.) In Swedish: “Rättsteorien står till lagstiftningen och praxis i dubbelt förhållande, både så, att hon genom utredande af grundsatserna för rätten på förhand leder dem, som äro organ för lagstiftningen och rättstillämpningen, och så, att hon genom bearbetande af de genom lagstiftning och lagskipning redan uttalade rättssatserna bestämmer och begränsar deras användningsområde.” 22 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 23 Cf. Francis Hagerup (1853-1921) who argued that legal science retained the authority to work productively in a strong sense - that is, to formulate new and autonomously binding principles of law. See Hagerup’s program for legal science: Francis “Legal theory stands in a dual relationship to legislation and practice, insofar as she [i.e., legal theory] both, by investigating the principles of law in advance guides those, who act as organs for legislation and adjudication, and that she by processing the propositions already provided by legislation and adjudication thus determines and limits their scope of application.”21
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