tutes an organic totality its development must be equally unified,15 and valid law is thus the correspondence between the general consciousness of law and its technical expressions. Those factors that distinguish the various technical sources of law from one another are on the one hand their respective degree of separation from the general consciousness of law, and on the other those specific technical forms through which they express their respective sets of rules.16The most direct route between the consciousness of law and law is the route between this specific consciousness and the customs of the people (hereinafter customary law).The remaining sources travel the routes laid down by various institutions of society used as organs for the general consciousness to express the law.17 In this respect Nordling made a distinction that corresponds to a distinction with roots in ancient/medieval doctrine of sources - namely, the distinction between written and unwritten law; norms that on the one hand gain validity and become law on account of an expressed act of a specific sovereign political body and on the other, norms that gain validity and become law on account of their content being exercised or practiced and accepted by the relevant agents of the legal order.18 The respective degrees of separation of the technical sources of law with respect to the general consciousness of law was compensated for in the clarity and precision inherent in directly formulated rules – as opposed to the inherent vagueness of rules inferred from popular practices, customs and ideas of equity.When it comes to the issue of the direct effect of the sources of law a definite internal difference exists between the various technical sources of law, insofar as customary law, legislation and court practice affect directly the material content of valid law, while legal theory affects the material content indirectly.19 As mentioned above, Nordling argued that the legitimacy and validity max ly l e s 165 gan om den objektiva rättens begrepp I.Viljeteorien (Uppsala & Leipzig, 1917), pp. 3536, footnote 1.) 15 See e.g. Nordling, Svensk civilrätt, p. 27 and 29. 16 Ibid., p. 29. 17 Ibid., pp. 26-31. 18 Ibid., pp. 26-27.On the historical use of this distinction in law see: Stephan Meder, Ius non scriptum - Traditionen privater Rechtsetzung (Tübingen,2008), pp. 8-10et passim. 19 Nordling, Svensk civilrätt, p. 29. 2.1.2. The Positive Task of Legal Science
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