From a general point of view, in accordance with his contemporaries (and tradition), Nordling distinguishes between the rules of morality (“sedelagen”), which in accordance with Nordling’s idealism is universal, and the rules of law (“rättslagen”) which is particular.And when it comes to the study of law itself a further distinction or clarification is attempted when he argues that law ultimately belongs to a rational discourse, the natural law, which is permeates every human notion of justice. However, in the various societies of Man this universal notion of justice is restricted to those rules of positive law expressed via the technical sources of law.6 Accordingly, the universal notion of rational law is of interest to the legal scholar insofar as it is expressed in the positive sources of law. (It thus comes as no surprise that Hägerström, claims that Nordling’s theory of law contains metaphysical elements, see section 3 below). In particular, that is,in any given society,Nordling argued that law was identical with the general precepts of the general consciousness, and accordingly this category constituted law in the true, or material, sense.7 But, the general consciousness of law had gradually become separe cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 162 muel Bring,Grunderna till svenska civil-lagfarenheten uti systematisk ordning, första delen (Lund, 1817), pp. 48-57.) During the 1830s professors Carl Olof Delldén (1800-1854) and Carl Johan Schlyter (1795-1888) continued to stress the importance of theoretical learning for practicing jurists, thus attempting to bridge the conceptual gap between theory and practice. (Carl Olof Delldén,“Studie-plan för den svenske juristen af C.O.Dn,”Juridskt Arkif 1831, pp. 99-151; Carl Johan Schlyter, Om laghistoriens studium, och dess förhållande till rättsvetenskapens öfriga delar: inledning till föreläsningar hållna vid Kongl. Universitetet i Upsala vårterminen 1835, Stockholm, 1835.) On the general account of the influence of the Historical School over Scandinavian jurisprudence 1815-1971, see Lars Björne: Den nordiska rättsvetenskapens historia 2. Brytningstiden: 1815-1870 (Stockholm, 1998), pp. 229-46 and 427-33. 6 ErnstViktor Nordling,Anteckningar efter prof. E.V.Nordlings föreläsningar i svensk civilrätt: allmänna delen H.T. 1877-V.T. 1879 (Uppsala, 1882), pp. 1-8 and 36-39. 7 Nordling’s use of the general consciousness of law as a jurisprudential concept possessing near transcendental characteristics constituted an example of legal metaphysics that Hägerström considered being scientifically invalid since the general consciousness of law could not be upheld or affirmed autonomously of the law of the land. In fact the notions of law and justice prevailing in the general consciousness of law were inseparable from the laws of the prevalent legal order. (Axel Hägerström, “Förhållandet mellan staten och rätten (1924),” in Rätten och staten: tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi, ed. Martin Fries (Stockholm, 1963), pp. 235-39.) 2.1. The Sources of Law according to Ernst Viktor Nordling
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