tive status where the collective understanding of law on the part of jurists begins to conform to the combined results of legal science - namely, its systems, theories, analyses, exegeses, principles, concepts and abstractions.And from a practical point of view the stability and certainty necessary for the proper application of law requires that positive law itself must be organized into an organic totality.2 But it is unclear whether this claim is of an internal origin corresponding with scientific demands, or has an external origin in accordance with social demands. Regardless of origin, Nordling argued that it was through the scientific construction of law that the administration of law became just, good and certain.3 Consequently, theory, that is the scientific study of law (legal science, dogmatics), is practical and hence a normative discourse.4 Hence, by taking the demands that society placed upon the application of law - that it ought to be just, good, and certain - as his supreme dogma, Nordling declared that the traditional dichotomy of theory and practice constituted an illusion. In fact, the ultimate purposes of theory and praxis coincide rather than diverge, thereby placing Nordling’s ideas in the theoretical mainstream of 19th century legal theory5 - that jurisprudence is a practical science providing practitioners of law with the requisite tools for them to formalize the administration of justice. max ly l e s 161 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.The idea that the theoretical subjects of study (legal history, legal philosophy and Roman law) were of particular value for the proper education and training of both the theoretical and practicing jurist had been argued most vigorously by professor Knut Olivecrona in a debate with the former Justitieombudsman Sven LorensTheorell, who on the other hand argued that legal practitioners had preciously little to gain from theoretical studies. (Knut Olivecrona, Om den juridiska undervisningen vid universitetet i Upsala och om den juridiska facultetens förflyttande till Stockholm, 2 ed., (Upsala, 1859), pp. 11-15, 20-32, and116-35; Sven LorensTheorell, Ideer till en universitets-reform i helt annan rigtning, än som för den juridiska fakultetens ombildning blifvit å bane bragt (Stockholm, 1859), pp. 24-33.) For the entire debate, as well as the ideological and philosophical background, see Marie Sandström, Die Herrschaft der Rechtswissenschaft (Lund, 1989), passim. 5 Nordling is by no means an innovator in this respect.The notion that legal science must be regarded as a practical branch of science goes back even further in Swedish legal tradition. For instance, the polymath Ebbe Samuel Bring (1785-1855), whose philosophy was influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and FriedrichWillhelm Joseph Schelling, argued that in law, theory and practice were more closely related, not to say intertwined, than the popular (vulgar) opinion would have them. In fact, a proper understanding of law required that theory preceded practice. (Ebbe Sa-
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