In reflecting upon the nature of reality and knowledge,the philosopher Heraclitus is reputed to have said: An attempt at a traditionalist interpretation of the Uppsala School’s theory of legal doctrine (with respect to the legacy of the Historical School ) max ly l e s 159 And eve n though a lot of water has passed under the bridge since Heraclitus, the conundrum of jurisprudential theory is that despite its advances it still attends to unresolved points Tradition, conviction or necessity? 1. i nt roduc t i on “You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters and yet others go ever flowing on.” (Fragment 12.) “Into the same rivers we step and do not step.” (Fragment 49a.) of conflict identical to those that he reflected upon; namely the relationship between form and matter, universals and particulars, theory and practice. For despite the incessant flow of practice, theory still forms that very practice into a lasting, identifiable, and coherent universal out of a mass of particulars. From a general point of view it is the specific conditions when legal science as theory turns into practice and becomes normative with which this paper is concerned.The specific focus of this paper will be on the manner in which Swedish legal theory during the late 19th century to the early to mid-20th century – that is, the Swedish followers of the Historical School of Jurisprudence on the one hand, and the Uppsala School of Jurisprudence on the other – understood the nature, purpose and subject matter of legal science, especially with regard to their similarities. In particular I intend to discuss the schools’ theories in relation to certain ideas. For instance, the notion that legal science is a practical activity; the jurists’ argument that legal science must conform with practical needs or else lose its status as a legal argument and a source of law; and finally, the idea that the principles, concepts and doctrines of legal science constitute a guarantee against chaos in the administration
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