that there are different shades of grey too i.e. comparative law is neither good nor bad, it may also be something in-between. So, we seem to be in the need of a different kind of epistemology than epistemology based on un-solid dichotomous separation. Some of the claims above, directed against current epistemologies,may sound a bit disproportionate. But, in fact, it does not require much thought to conceive that internationalisation, Europeanisation, globalisation,and various developments toward transnational lawhave brought about a great change.56 Also the idea according to which a natural unit for comparatists is a national legal system has changed. Obviously, we do not have the full picture of all these far-reaching changes, perhaps never will, but what seems to be clear is that because of these changes we have today much more legal pluralismthan what we had in past decades. Therefore, the neat national boxes that comparative law learned to deal with during the 19th and20th centuries have either disappeared or at least transformed heavily. It might be argued that, if we put together the above presented critique concerning the dichotomous nature of comparative law epistemology and contemporary legal pluralism, it seems clear that more flexible epistemology would be in order. The actual puzzle that remains is the dichotomy itself: if one follows the strong theoretical and perfectionist currents (scientia or critical hermeneutics-philosophy) doing decent comparative law becomes virtually impossible. On the other hand, if one follows the simplistic ideas according to which comparative law is but giving accurate descriptions of formally conceived foreign legal systems (conceived mainly as rules) comparison becomes overtly positivistic and a downright boring technical exercise.58 What is, if any, the alternative to these extremes? re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 124 56 However, one should not assume that these developments would be a single process. Instead, there are developments going in somewhat opposite directions (e.g. the spread of human rights and spread of Islamic legal thinking).Actually, the plural form globalisations would fit better. See H. Patrick Glenn, LegalTraditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) pp. 51-53. 57 On legal pluralism see for more detailed discussion Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: towards a GeneralTheory through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokai University Press,Tokyo 1989). 58 See Mathias M. Siems, “The End of Comparative Law”, 2 Journal of Comparative 4 . d i scu s s i on : non d i chotomou s unde r stand i ng of e p i stemology
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