colours of the epistemic that urge to group, classify and build macroconstructs, are finally fully revealed: we ought to have an autonomous discipline of truly academic comparative law i.e. scientia. In accord, we must have theoretical vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft instead of un-theoretical vergleichende Rechtsgelehrsamkeit. To summarise, in academic comparative law numerous scholars have taken seriously the challenge to build macro-constructs in a theoretically rigours manner. Even so, the outcomes are not terribly convincing if you judge them according to scientia criteria.This as such is not interesting from the point of view of the argument in this paper. Perhaps, it suffices to say that there has been, and there still is, a strong desire to separate the comparative study of law which is made by poorly competent researchers from such a comparative study of law which is made by devoted and serious professionals i.e. scientists.This attitude in comparative law is old indeed and was expressed already by the father of modern comparative law himself, Ernst Rabel. He said in an educative tone that,“Nichts hat der Rechtsvergleichung mehr geschadet als ein gewisser Diletanttimus ihrer Anfänge”.55 Here it is tempting to say that this also explains further the urge to be scientific; beware of the dilettantes because they spoil it all. Or in other words, banish the dilettantes and gain a proper foothold in academia i.e. the scholarly mount Olympus which the comparative law discipline must climb. As such,the prudent appreciation of difficulties in macro-comparison makes obviously sense, but from the point of view of epistemology we can see that there is strong dichotomous thinking underlying the macro-projects in comparative law: it is regarded as crucial for scholarly comparative law to be distinguished from pitifully practical and untheoretical comparison of laws.There is certainly nothing problematic with this academically ambitious attitude, but the problem lies in the fact that the mutual exclusion of dichotomous division between theory and practice is simply too crude.We cannot separate theory and practice in such a crude manner. It is too blunt because it forces those who engage in the comparative study of law to think in terms of blackand-white only.This is a problem, because comparative law in today’s pluralistic and more and more transnational world does not follow these rigid epistemic basic divisions. Besides, all this is most likely somewhat a discouraging discourse for potential comparatists. I mean to say jaakko hu sa 123 55 Rabel,“Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung”, 13Rheinische Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozeßrecht (1924) 279-301, at 301.
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