concerning macro-constructs would be encountered seriously. One simple way would be to make comparison more empirically nuanced; the knowledge involved in other disciplines should obviously be exploited as epistemologically incorporated already in the building phase, not as a supplementary increment to the point of view of lawyers which might only be found in the footnote but not in the actual argument. In particular, the history of law, sociology of law and anthropology of law are such fields of knowledge that scholarly comparative lawyers have always explicitly admitted as being important to comparative law.49 Concisely put, more perfectionism would be the remedy, should we accept this line of thinking. Perhaps, however, the true difficulty lies elsewhere. Is it possible that all this is part of the methodological syndrome of the scientific comparative study of law? After all, comparatists have to a large extent wanted to act as soloists whose classifications and groupings may well be intellectually interesting but do not seem to change, let alone – if we use the word in its true sense – genuinely develop as they do in science.50 Instead, categorisations appear to reproduce themselves so that the core of the unscientific classification method stays intact, its vocabulary and reference material excluded (i.e. it looks and sounds as scientia-discourse at least). Nevertheless, nothing truly scientific seems to result from it.And, even those who are still trying to construct classifications in a more scientific manner normally end up by stating an endless amount of difficulties along this path. Peter Leyland who sees some merit in using the ideal-type methodology expresses this below in the following sentences in which the yes-but-no dilemma can be seen: jaakko hu sa 121 does it preclude the possibility of discovering or inventing suitable and fitting ones”. Besides, there are still some who see some possibilities for Weber’s “ideal-type” method in comparative law. See Peter Leyland,“Oppositions and Fragmentations: In Search of a Formula of Comparative Analysis?”, in Comparative Law in the 21st Century, edited by Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü (Kluwer, London 2002) pp. 211-233, see especially pp. 221-222. 49 Thus, if we argue that law is profoundly rooted in its social, political, economic, cultural, and historical context, then, this state of affairs should be incorporated in the epistemic and methodological fabric of comparative law as a field of the scholarly study of law. 50 See also Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 67. Nevertheless, in today’s situation the distinction between comparative law and sociology of law should not be exaggerated; they may be treated as companions not as bitter rivals. In this sense the distinction might simply be abandoned. Notwithstanding, see e.g. Constantinesco (1974) 224-230.
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