teristics and central principles shared by legal systems that in certain important macro-level aspects resemble one another.With theoretical macro-constructs, it is possible to replace the less systematic and more fragmented information by which the comparatist might otherwise have to operate. From a methodological perspective, macro-constructs concern the conditions required for the interpretation and understanding of foreign law from (epistemically) an outsider’s point of view. In other words, the importance of such a macro-construct for factual understanding of foreign law is that it smoothes out and reduces difficulties; it is like a first roughly sketched map and guide that an outsider who wishes to find roughly the correct information regarding foreign law can refer to,when planning a more detailed route for later on.Thus, such a macro-construct is systematic and structured “pre-understanding” which does not fully correspond with (unfamiliar) legal reality. What was said above results in the following conclusion:benefits from such macro-constructs seem to be very similar to those of comparative law in general. On the one hand, these benefits can be methodologically connected with the micro-level research of comparative law. On the other, the benefits can be intermediary by nature and mainly related to educational goals as already emphasised byRéne David.39 According to what has been claimed here, the process of understanding in micro-comparison proceeds so that a actual legal system is compared to a pure type, i.e. a legal family or equivalent.Such a process enables three things that are essential to comparison:1)The comparatist can approach an unfamiliar legal system guided by a preliminary, hypothetical but justified pre-perception; 2) This facilitates the later search for material and gives grounds for subsequent description of differences and similarities; 3) This also enables a readiness to encounter dissimilarity and lessens the challenge presented by interpretation although the detailed nuances of foreign law remain covert. The widely claimed task of the (scholarly oriented) comparatist, i.e. acquiring new knowledge and better understanding of legal material, becomes easier because the system studied can be compared through an epistemic matrix other than the expectation ceiling based on one’s own legal system.The epistemic transfer from one’s own legal system to a foreign one becomes easier if the comparatist can use constructed macro-concepts. By means of macro-constructs it is possible to descrire cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 116 39 David (1969) p. 23. See also Malmström (1969) p. 145.
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