comparative law and does so by stating that the comparative study of law must be done “scientifically correctly”. In accordance, comparative law seems to trap itself between the Scylla of Theory and Charybdis of Practice. From the point of view of balanced epistemology, both of these possibilities are equally perilous alternatives i.e. comparative law does not seem to be able to pass without falling victim to the other: either it is doomed to carry out “non-scientific un-theoretical comparative law” or to struggle toward “scientific theoretical good comparative law”.We can make this claim even stronger by stating that the problem with this standard view is that it fails to grasp the plural nature and richness of comparative law approaches.Therefore, it cannot ensure well-balanced and realistic epistemology for the purposes of today. The purpose of this paper is to challenge this dichotomy and to argue that comparative law may not necessarily be conceived only as black or white.This paper claims that this dichotomy between theory and practice is way too crude of an epistemological distinction to be of any value while dealing with the comparative study of law. Rather, it appears that comparison of laws is never absolutely void of theoretical dimensions, even though some extreme forms of comparative law may sometimes be almost void of practical dimensions. Both mainstream and non-mainstream comparative law literature seems to exaggerate the dichotomous great divide while trying to legitimise certain normative epistemic views concerning what is “the right way” in which to do comparative law.The author of this paper claims that both of these views are one-dimensional and, thus,miss the plethora of different fruitful ways to apply comparative approaches in the legal world of today which is deeply affected by globalisation, Europeanisation, and accompanying legal pluralism.The conclusion addresses the possibility of taking distance from dichotomous epistemology. It is proposed that comparative study of law might benefit from looking into Aristotelian non-dichotomous epistemology, thus allowing for the conceiving of comparative law as a form of practical wisdom (i.e. prudence) rather than either a theoretical or practical form of knowledge. If it is argued, as it is here, that epistemological self-understanding of comparative law is as to its nature dichotomous then it is necessary to define what one means by dichotomous. If this concept is viewed from re cht swi s s e n scha f t al s j ur i st i sch e dok t r i n 106 2 . p re s e ntat i on s of d i chotomy
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