“οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ’ ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως” Άριστοτέλης1 jaakko hu sa1 105 * Jaakko Husa is Professor of Constitutional Law and General Jurisprudence at the University of Eastern - Finland) and an Invited Fellow inTilburg Institute of Comparative and Transnational Law. 1 “practical knowledge/prudence (italics here) is not science nor art; not science because that what can be done is capable of being done otherwise, not art because doing and creating are different things”, Αριστοτέλους, Ηθικά ΝικομάχειαI-II (Νομική Bιβλιο θήκη, Aθήνα 1993) μτφρ. B. Mοσκόβης (Bekker line location 1140b 1). 2 The concept of comparative law is used here in a broad manner i.e. it covers all sorts of comparative study of law (e.g. comparative legal studies,Auslandsrechtskunde etc.). Notwithstanding, the question concerning the nature of comparative law and its methodology has always interested comparatists of all sorts. Here these questions are not dealt with. See, e.g., Pierre Arminjon, Boris Nolde, MartinWolff, Traité de droit comparé Tome I (Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence, Paris 1950) pp. 23-41 (“le droit comparé une discipline juridique autonome” at p. 25), LéontinJean Constantinesco, Traité de droit comparé Tome II (Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence, Paris 1974) pp. 56-58 (defending the unity of comparative law method), Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law3rd edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998) pp. 2-12 (arguing what comparative law is not),Michael Bogdan,Komparativ rättskunskap (Norstedts juridik, Stockholm 2003) pp. 21-25 (in-between opinion). h i s pape r deals with the supposed conflict between the theo- Tretical and practical within the comparative study of law.This conflict can be easily detected in any larger standard work on comparative law and in practically all other texts that deal with the epistemology of comparative law.2 Comparative law, in particular academic comparative law, has a constant struggle with two challenges. On the one hand, it seeks to justify its very existence to doctrinal study of law (i.e. Rechtsdogmatik) and to legal practice (e.g. judicial function, law drafting). On the other hand, it wishes to distance itself from practical 1. i nt roduc t i on The False Dichotomy between Theory and Practice: Lessons from Comparative Law *
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