Inthe spirit of weber 227 did not appear on the Continent during or after the development of capitalism. Weber argued that a variety of forces had shaped the development of legal systems (professional, economic, social and plotical). But does this not expose yet another one of those Weberian paradoxes? For as Ferguson observes, Weber’s admission that capitalism and different but relatively predictable forms of law co-existed on both sides of the Channel leaves open the possibility that capitalism played a decisively important role in the development of English and Continental law."^* Logically, therefore, his repudiation of economist interpretations is not conclusively supported by his arguments. His emphasis upon a multi-causal approach has merely the status of a possible interpretation of the historical record. So far as I have merely traversed by way of an introduction the familiar concerns and methods of most scholars preoccupied with Weber’s sociology of law, that it, to concentrate on his thesis concerning the causal importance of formal rational lawthrough a reconciliation or otherwise of what he wrote. In fact, Weber’s discussion of England has received relatively little attention - save as an adjunct to the debate on the causal importance of formal rational law. The remainder of this paper argues for a significant shift of attention. The crux of my argument is as follows: 1) We need to reinstate the importance of Weber’s discussion of the peculiarities of England beyond the light that it sheds on the causal importance or otherwise of formal rational law. 2) In particular, the effort to defend Weber against the charge of inconsistency - to convert the “contradictory” in Weber into a “complex analysis” — can neither reconcile nor remove the abidingcontrariety, "... the liquid and evasive richness which is the secret of Weber’s strongest sorcery over all his successors.Indeed, to render the contradictions as the core - rather than the periphery - of his account of law and modernity can offer valuable insights into the distinctive character of law and society in the modern world as well as significantly problematise those posited by Weber himself. 3) Weber’s discussion of England illuminates the important and much neglected role of the irrational in law, state and society. 4) Weber’s discussion of England complements and contrasts with the dominant tradition in the historiography of England which emphasises the English road to modernity as one of increasing rationality. It is time to bring together these two discrete but co-extensive debates since they contain much that will enrich each other. 5) To exploit the internal tensions within Weber’s thought is undoubtedly useful. Nonetheless, exegesis is of limited value. Weber’s sociology of law also reSee, generally, Ferguson, “Lawand Commercial Order”, op. cit., pp. 26-37. See, also, Cain, “The Limits of Idealism”, op. cit., p. 72. D. G. MacRae, Weber, (London: Fontana, 1974), p. 88. This is not to say that the recent efforts of Brubaker and Kronman to emphasise the coherence and unites within Weber’s thought are not valuable.
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