David Sugarman from “irrationality” to “rationality” in thought, culture and society.^ Thus, the historical and sociological imaginations constructed models or images of modernity grounded in oppositions: pre-modern/modern, pre-industrial, irrational/ rational, primitive/civilised, status/contract, Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft/, personal/ impersonal, elite/popular, collectivism/individualism, high/ lowetc., etc.'* Whilst the quest for the distinctive features of modern social and legal life has been significantly shaped by moral and political concerns, other factors may have been at work. Our search for unity and individuality invites the kinds of simple categories and polarities which though often unacknowledged frequently play a significant role in defining “self” and “others”, that is, who we are. Thus, the attempt to identify ourselves and distinguish the past is both essential and perennial. As Kolakowski observes: “By trying to identify our civilisation, we try to identify ourselves, to grasp the unique collective ‘Ego’ which would be necessary, and whose non-existence would be as little conceivable as is for me my own non-existence. And so, even though there is no answer to the question ‘Why is our culture what it is?’, it is unlikely that the question will be deleted fromour minds. 218 ”5 Nevertheless, it has become increasingly apparent that the traditional characterisations of “pre-modern” and “modern” are caricatures. Methodologically, they have sustained and have been sustained by a unitary conception of “society” as a systematic totality; and a highly teleological approach to history, law and sociology. The richness, insight and passion of Smith, Montesquieu, Marx, Weber and Durkheim have frequently been compressed and coagulated as they have been appropriated and rendered uncomplicated by disciples, critics and popularisers. However, it is not possible to simply return to our Smith, Montesquieu, Marx, Weber and Durkheim for the answers.^ Their frame- ^ In other words, since Weber, the dominant tradition in the human sciences has tended to define modernity in terms of the singular character of post-Reformation asceticism. Although much of Foucault’s work reproduced this facet of the Weberian legacy, his final work rejected the assoelation of modernity with the so-called disciplinary rationalismof the period 1780-1850. Instead, he looked to the beginnings of Western reason itself as the harbinger of the disciplinary approach towards sexual behaviour which haunts us still. See M. Foucault, Histoire de aa Sexualite Tome 2 and 3, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). This represents an important break with the Weberian tradition (and the bulk of Foucault’s owm work), though continuity and “origins” tend to lie in the eyes of the beholder. See, also, Berman’s argument that the development of rational law began significantly earlier than the conventional dichotomy between medieval and modern permits: H. Berman. Law and Revolution: the Transformation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). See, for example, Kumar, op. p. 63. 5 L. Kolakowski, “Modernity on Endless Trial”. Encounter, Ixv;, March, 1986, pp. 8-12, p. 9. ^ See Kumar, op. cit. p. 238.
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