32 BartoloméCi.avero transition to a different experience take place? Was communication facilitated fromthis other side? It has to be remembered what was aimed at, not only any system with no codification, but cases which might respond to the opposite concept of the legal order as a principle not of sufficiency of lawor statute, but of prevalence of liberty or right, cases which, if they had no codes, were because of this reason. That was how, moreover, the same way of communication could be drawn; otherwise, without the link of some principles, such a thing would have been unthinkable. Having said that, was such a thing, exactly this and exactly then, at the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century, offered from England or from Switzerland? I must confess that I do not know what could be offered fromSwitzerland, but as far as England is concerned it is beyond doubt that in those times no constitutionalism founded on liberties and thus communicable was provided; reviewing the corresponding written works it can be seen that, at the time, England gave the image of a political order and institutional system as peculiar as untransferable, precisely because no inspiring base, no constitutive case of individual liberty and social autonomy was emphasised, brought to the foreground.I do not mean that such a thing did not exist, which is beyond the limits of my study, but that it did not become manifest and was not received. Yet there is no need to wait until the twentieth century to see how, between the different cases, the bridges of some principles appeared, those of rights and liberties, since this had happened by former times in regards to England and in relation to Spain.'' At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century we are in an epoch of constitutional eclipse and juridical incommunication, two closely linked phenomenons. 6. Aprinciple of Succession Law Let us put finally an example of private Law which might be more expressive, that of the dilemma between the freedom to dispose by testament and the hereditary division by law, between whose terms the successory debate was posed.'* This dilemma was resolved, for the codification, for the Napoleonic model, in favour of the latter, that of the substantial regulation of successions not by the individual, the family or the society, but by the legislation, by the Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, since 1867—1872 (trad. Adolfo Posada, La Constituciön Inglesa, Madrid s. d., ca. 1920); Albert Venn Dicev, Introduction to the Study of the Lawof the Constitution, since 1885; WilliamR. Arson, Lawand Customof the Constitution, since 1886. " Banolomé Clavero, Estudio Preliminär a Jean-Louis De Lolme, La Constitucion de Inglaterra, Madrid 1992. Diethelm Krippel, Lamilie versus Eiqentum. Die naturrechtlich-rechtsphilosophischen Begriindungen von Testierfreiheit und Lamilienerbrecht im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, in Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fiir Rechtsgeschichte (Germ. Abt.), 101, 1984, pp. 117—168.
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