128 agreement m Copenhagen the Swedish buyer had confirmed the purchase and as a term of payment noted “three months’ acceptance, free of interest”. The Danish seller in his turn confirmed the contract but called the buyer’s attention to the fact that, as the price was fixed in pounds sterling, payment should be made by 90 days’ documentary credit in London (probably the customof the trade in Copenhagen). It was not until a month later that the buyer declared in a letter that he did not want the coffee delivered, because his terms of payment had not been approved. By a small majority the Supreme Court held the buyer bound by the contract on the Danish seller’s conditions, on the grounds that he had not objected that his terms of payment had not been approved until too long after receiving the seller’s letter. The lower courts as well as a minority of the Supreme Court, however, held that no complete contract had been proved. A later case from 1909 (p. 195) had a similar outcome. A week’s delay was enough for the buyer to lose his right to object to the contract. Later on the Supreme Court has been more inclined to confine the effect of such delay to an unfavourable position as far as evidence is concerned. Delay in objecting to the terms contained in a confirmation letter (in contrast to an offer or an acceptance) places the burden of proof on the party in delay. But the position of law in this field is still somewhat uncertain. The cases dealt with in this chapter are only intended to shtiw how at the turn of the century the courts attached growing importance to the need for speedy reactions mcommercial relations to avoid unfavourable legal consequences. Chapters 4-6 deal mainly with the Supreme Ctturt’s methods of interpreting and supplementing contracts. It is a story describing how after a start in formalism more subtle methods of establishing what a contract means and implies were gradually introduced. In the beginning literal interpretation was predominant. The Natural l.aw drew the attention to the will of the parties instead of the wording. This method was given a famous expression in the Code civil article 1156. The Code civil also contained other rules concerning the interpretation of contracts, originating partly m Roman law, inter aha the rule called contra proferentem (article 1162) and even a reference to usage for supplementing contracts (article 1160). The old Swedish textbooks mentioned above also contained expositions on the interpretation of contracts. Both Nehrman and Schrevelius founded their teaching mainly on the “will theory”. The decisive factor, when the meaning of a contract was to be established, should be what the persem who gave the promise had intended - a subjective method of interpretation. Nordling, on the other hand, together with the Dane Lassen, represented a more obiective school of thought, what is called the “reliance theory”. The decisive factor is what the receiver of the promise with good reason and in good faith has conceived as being the meaning of the promise - an objective method of interpretation. This “theory”, established particularly for solving cases of mistakes in the wording of the contract, has also been applied m the interpretation of contracts, where the objective rule has become more and more dominant. Not many earlv cases concerning interpretation of contracts have been reported. This may be due to the fact that very few such cases were brought to the courts but also that such cases were not reported." There seem to be very few cases reported before the 1870’s. The earliest example I have found dates from 1869 and demonstrates a rigid adherence to the words of the contract without anv consideration for other circumstances. Fromthe 187C’s and onwards, however, there are several cases in which the Supreme Court took into account a great number of circumstances, not only the wording, when interpreting contracts. ’ The editor ot one of the older lawreport series expressly stated that he did not report eases \\ hieh turned onl\’ on the meanins; ot words in eontracts.
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