126 Alter the exposition of the general legal background in chapter 1 the case law of the Supreme Court is dealt with in the remaining chapters (2-6). First I shall make a few remarks on the case law' material. Only printed law reports have been used. They cover the period from 1823 and onw'ards. The years betw'een 1789, when the Supreme Court was established, and the early 1820’s are thus unexplored, but in view of the scantiness of the material from the years before 1870 I decided to refrain from studies of the archive material. I have run through some 700 cases, many of course without anv interest, and I have as has been mentioned concentrated on questions concerning the formation and construction of contracts. Although the number of cases is fairly large, the material is by no means abundant. This IS due to the fact that the reasons in support of a judgment are usually very poor; and the Supreme Court has in many cases only affirmed the judgment of one of the lower courts, without giving its own reasons. Furthermore very fewcases concern matters of principle, such as have attracted attention in the literature. The general law’ of contract is abstract in character. One might perhaps have expected a fight betw'een adherents of the contract theory and the promise theory respectively, but nothing of the kind is found, and declarations of principle are very rare. This pragmatic non-theoretical attitude is typical of the Sw'edish courts. Be that as it may, the law developed in such a way that the innovations of the Contracts Act were fewer than might have been expected. A proof of this is that a famous textbook on private law was very little altered in the edition that followed after the Contracts Act had been passed. Chapter 2 deals with cases which turn on the formation of contracts or (which seems to be a more appropriate question at issue), what is required for a binding contract. Some of these cases will be mentioned in brief. In a case decided in 1826, the earliest I have dealt with, the issue was whether a binding contract of sale had been concluded. The seller had refused to deliver. Whereas the court of appeal had regarded the contract as concluded according to the usage normally observed between merchants, the Supreme Court, like the local court, deemed the contract not to have been completed, probably because nothing had so far been decided about the terms of payment. This case seems to illustrate a clash between the old idea that a contract must be the outcome of a complete cofisemus ad idem, and a modern summary mode of concluding contracts which was apparentlv necessarv to satisfy the need for speedy transactions, which as time went on, were concluded b\' means of the telegraph and in a telegraphic summary style (in the case mentioned letters had been sent b\' mail). Between merchants it was convenient to agree expressK' onl\ on the goods, time for delivery and the price, leaving the rest to be regulated bv custom and usage, and this worked well in most cases. The old rigid rule was probably used as a pretext bv which those who wished to get awav from the contract could do so. Of old the courts maintained a sceptical attitude towards usage as a source of law, but gradually the attitude became more favourable. In the Sale of goods Act of 19C5 usage was placed ahead of optional law as a source of law. A case from 1879 (p. 307)' probably reflects adherence to the contract theory, although the reasons stated bv the majority are somewhat obscure. The parties had communicated by means ot the telegraph on a sale of oats and the seller had declared the negotiations to be broken off, before he had received an unqualified acceptance. This was probably decisive, provided that the offer was looked upon as revocable, and 1 believe this explains the outcome. ' Cases are quoted b\- vear and page reterring to the semiofficial yearbook of law reports \rtt juridiskt arkiv.
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