290 function of guiding the development of the law through precedent. This has been accomplished by means of requiring special permission {dispens) to be obtained, usually froma chamber of three judges, before the Supreme Court can hear the case. The main grounds for obtaining dispens are that the judgment of the Court of Appeal appears to be mistaken either as a matter of law or with regard to the facts {ändringsdispens), or that the case can have significance as a precedent {prejudikatdispens). The position that has been taken regarding the extent to which one or other sort of dispens should be granted has changed fromtime to time. There are two different opinions in this regard; a “popular” viewpoint and a technical viewpoint. The former expects the Supreme Court to ensure that justice is done in a particular case as well as to develop the law by establishing the right sort of precedents. The latter wishes to emphasise the Court’s precedent creating function, even if this involves, to some degree, refusing to take up wrongly decided cases from the appeal courts. The latter viewpoint can certainly be supported by a number of different technical arguments but it is not easy to reconcile it with a judge’s own conception of his or her role, nor with the public or the mass media’s conception of that role. The need for dispens was first created by statute in 1915. It was laid down that, general, before appeals could be made in civil cases which involved sums of money of less than 1.500 kronor or in criminal cases where these involved minor offences, the case required to have importance as a precedent. This rule was the subject of criticism, particularly fromliberals. In more important cases there was no such requirement for dispens. After a considerable amount of debate and hesitation the need to obtain dispens was finally introduced for all cases with the enactment of the Code of Judicial Procedure in 1948. Prejudikatdispens could now be given for any case and ändringsdispens for the majority of important cases. It was thought that substantive justice could be safeguarded by providing for the possibility of ändringsdispens, although it is clear that this type of preliminary review is designed to be of a more superficial nature, even if no account is taken of the fact that it is a purely written procedure, limited to scrutiny of the written evidence. In any event, the Supreme Court did not grant ändringsdispens to the extent that had been expected, a fact which led to political criticism from certain quarters. Notwithstanding this criticism, a subsequent review of the law recommended the further limitation of ändringsdispens, and in 1971 it was abolished except for a small number of exceptions (grave material error, the appearance of important evidence not previously available to the appeal court etc.). In later years the Supreme Court’s character as a precedent creating body has been further strengthened, inter alia by allowing a single judge to hear applications for dispens. If, however, these developments should resuit in substantive justice becoming of subsidiary importance, this would be difficult to reconcile with society’s views on the role of the judicial system.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=