236 with, it is necessary to ascertain the purpose of the provision. This is done by applying it to a number of clear cases. Take, for example, the rule that a debt should be repaid by the date specified in the loan agreement. The knowledge that a debt has to be repaid by the date specified in such an agreement encourages creditors to extend credit and this increases the general availability of credit for those who need it. This, then, is the purpose of the rule. Where, however, the application of this rule in a hard case does not contribute to increasing the availability of credit then the rule is not applicable to that hard case. Thus, where a rule has a vague area of possible application this method of interpretation shows where the line should be drawn between extensive and restrictive application of the provision. It also indicates whether, exceptionally, e contrario and ex analogia applications outside the “outer boundary” of the clear literal meaning of the rules should be permissible. In this way, decision making in “hard cases” will pay the same attention to the purpose of the legislation as does decision making in “clear cases”. The application of this method of teleological interpretation is controversial in Sweden. Nonetheless, it is clear that in recent years the Supreme Court has increasingly had resort to some form of teleological reasoning, emphasising the purpose of a statute, in deciding cases.
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