235 styrka varierar — framför allt med hänsyn till svårigheterna att säkra bevisning för rättsfaktum i fråga - anser däremot att allt kommer an på om beviskravet uppfyllts eller inte. Vad man anser häromkan — liksomi fråga ombeviskravet — påverka målets utgång. Även rörande sådana spörsmål kan ett justitieråd finna anledning att lita till sin intuition. Då invecklade frågor om bevisvärdering för närvarande inte kan bli föremål för prövningstillstånd, är väl meningsmotsättningarna härom inte av så stort intresse för HD. Då man 1942 upphävde de legala bevisvärdereglerna i 1734 års lag, tänkte man sig att bevisvärderingen skulle handhas rent skönsmässigt. Då processreformen skulle genomföras, satte jag mig emellertid ned och försökte formulera vissa tumregler härför. Och omnågra dagar hålls det ett symposium i Uppsala, där anhängarna av bevistemamodellen och bevisvärdemodellen drabbar samman. Det är nog bara en tidsfråga, innan HD får meddela prövningstillstånd även rörande invecklade bevisvärderingsfrågor. Summary The Supreme Court and “theoretical” legal writing By legal writing (sw. doktrin) I am referring to theoretical analysis, dealing with the meaning of legal rules and how they are applied. During certain periods, a distinction has been made between the “theoretical” and “practical” application of legal rules, the former being undertaken in universities and the latter in the courts. Even during such periods, however, the case law of the courts has been influenced to some extent by the theoretical work. In Sweden, judicial reasoning was formerly heavily influenced by roman law and natural law. A reaction occured against the latter in the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the influence of the historical/analytical school of jurisprudence, as represented by Savigny, began to make itself felt. By the end of the nineteenth century, a new school, positivism, had attained the ascendency in judicial reasoning. It can be said that, in earlier centuries, the influence of these different schools was felt successively; each succeeded the other. In the twentieth century, however, there has been no single dominant school of legal theory. Some legal theoreticians in Sweden have urged judges to look for guidance in interpreting the meaning of a rule exclusively in the travaux préparatoires to the legislation, others, like Savigny, have considered that several different courses of action ought to be available to the judge. I suggested some time ago a form of teleological method resembling the “Wertungsjurisprudenz” or “wertkritisches Verfahren”, pioneered by Philip Heck in the beginning of the century and which is currently popular in West Germany. Like Heck, my starting point has been the results of modern research in semantics confirming the inherent vagueness of ordinary i.e. nonlegal language. The teleological method I recommend is, however, special in one respect. The determination of “hard” or exceptional cases is to occur in a different way from“clear” ordinary cases. In the latter, the words in the relevant provision in the legislation are to be given a literal interpretation, as this is the best way of providing for the greatest impact of, and ensuring the efficacy of, the law in society. In the former, however, resort must be had to a more complicated procedure, which I have called “construction”. To begin
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