122 in interpreting and applying the law and excluded himfromdealing with constitutional and other public law matters. The Supreme Courts of Denmark, Norway and Sweden all tended to move in the direction of increased independence, though in Sweden admittedly only from the time of the Instrument of Government (1809) and in Denmark in spite of the theoretical absolute power of the king. In addition, the connection between the Executive power and the power of the courts steadily loosened. This latter development, however, proceeded more slowly in Sweden than in the other two countries. The Norwegian Supreme Court was at the forefront of both of these developments. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, all three courts had only indirect competence to reviewthe acts of the Executive. Neither the Swedish nor the Danish courts had the competence to review the compatibility of laws with the Constitution. By contrast, in Norway, a theory developed at an early stage which opened the way for the courts to exercise direct control over the activities of the Executive power. It would also appear that, in Norway, fromthe very beginning, the Constitution was perceived as part of the lawof the land to be applied by the courts even with respect to the legislative power. Supreme court judges in both Norway and Sweden played a role during the period in question in the special courts of impeachment {riksretten) established to hear cases concerning alleged Executive violations of the Swedish and Norwegian Instruments of Government. The two courts, however, were very different and such cases of constitutional significance were both more frequent and more important in Norway. It is reasonable to assume that these features in the time period in question provide us with important clues to understanding the roles played by the three supreme courts in later developments in Nordic constitutional law.
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