On the Use of Natural Law 67 had never been made and the war had never come to an end.®® Sweden’s position forced Charles Gustavus to take to arms against Denmark once more.®® With some exceptions, Pufendorf does not explain the actions of Denmark as motivated by state interests, although in all probability this would have been possible. A picture is given where Denmark, driven by hatred against Sweden and by the wish to regain lost territories, constantly seeks war against Sweden and rejects the offers of peace that are made by Charles Gustavus. In the negotiations the Danes had no honest intention to reach agreements or to put those which have been reached into effect. Instead, a cunning policy of retardation was followed. Most significant are the actions after the Treaty of Roskilde. These show that the treaty had not really been concluded. From that it followed that the war had not ended. The actions of Sweden and its monarch, as described by Pufendorf, have been partly referred to already. The eastern policy of Charles Gustavus is never questioned. His endeavour to reach agreements and his honest wish for peace are emphasized, not least in regard to Denmark. When he acts against Brandenburg and on two occasions against Denmark, he is obviously driven by interests of state. Stress is laid upon the honesty of the Swedes in negotiations, although the diplomats then naturally had some different options at hand. Furthermore, the personal qualities of the Swedish king are mentioned in a most flattering way. Breaking Treaties and Breaking Natural Law In theory, the political process, as described by Pufendorf in the history of Charles Gustavus contained two breaches of treaty, though in practice there only was one. These are, pro primo, the breach of Frederick William III with the Swedes in July, 1657, and pro secundo, the renewal of hostilities by Charles Gustavus against Denmark the following year. The action of the Great Elector may clearly be justified by interests of state. His policy was oriented towards eastern Europe, from where the threats against his position came. The war against Denmark would have been costly and to him the crucial question was to make sure of his full sovereignty over Prussia. Thus he had no interest in taking part in the war against Denmark. In addition, he twice tried to mediate between the two antagonists. For Charles Gustavus the situation in 1658 was quite different. Denmark’s constant policy of delay in the negotiations and its all but openly expressed refusal to carry out the Treaty of Roskilde hardly made the «« ibid. V §§ 43—44. ibid. V § 95.
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