Lars Niléhn 66 Swedish monarch was careful not to give the Danes any reasons for their evil designs. In all probability, the Danes would take to arms at a suitable time. They were driven by hatred for Sweden and by the plots of other states. The Danes also tried to delay the ratification of the Treaty of Elbing and to separate the Great Elector from Sweden.®^ In 1657 Denmark obviously sought war. Several factors strengthened this intention, such as the Russian attack on Sweden and Sweden’s poor finances. Furthermore, in spite of the Treaty of Elbing, the Netherlands was not a reliable partner for Sweden. Charles Gustavus waited. He expected war, but looked for peace. Simultaneously Denmark made strong preparations. For Denmark the opportunity had come. Economic conditions and inadequate armaments was, by some advisors totheking, used as arguments against war, but the wish to regain lost territories was stronger.®^ Negotiations were held between the two states, but the Danes took part in these only to gain time and merely prolonged them. It was practically impossible to have themtake a firm stand on anything and they were at times even spiteful in the proceedings. Brandenburg as well as England advised against war, but Denmark nevertheless started it. Despite his wish for peace Charles Gustavus had to march against Denmark. He did not want to do this, but Denmark had an agreement with Poland and was encouraged by Austria.®^ For Denmark, the war went badly and it was forced to peace negotiations in Roskilde. Here the Danes asked not only for peace but for a defensive alliance. However, this was just a stratagemto avoid the things that Charles Gustavus considered most important. The Danes kept up appearance, excelling in a meaningless wrangle of words, trying to gain time. At the same time new troops arrived. These had been recruited by the Danes in the Netherlands.®® Constant denials and retardations raised the suspicion of Charles Gustavus. To him the most important thing was to feel secure from Denmark. It was necessary to prevent attacks from there. After an agreement had been reached, new negotiations followed in Copenhagen, where the Danish policy nevertheless remained the same.®^ When the Swedish army was forced to return to Poland, the Danes withdrew the promises given and raised many obstacles against putting the peace treaty of Roskilde into effect. Then a number of German princes turned against Sweden, and a new war was inevitable. In reality, the peace ibid. Ill §§ 85—89. «-* ibid. IV §§ 55—60. ibid. IV §§ 61—77. «« ibid. V §§ 24—25. «■ ibid. V §§ 28—36.
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