On the Use of Natural La\(' 59 states as an instrument to reach a deeper understanding of the political conditions of different states. This means that there is a decided difference between his theories of the state and his historical and political thinking.^^ On the other hand, it has been put forward that Pufendorf did not argue that there exists a state interest free of morals. Natural law is a norm for this interest as well. This means that it is not the case that the only legitimate interest of a state is what corresponds with its own sphere of law.^- Both of the theories referred to above seem to argue that there is a difference, if hardly a contradiction, between Pufendorf’s ideas of natural law and the fundamental basis of his theories of the state, as this is seen in his writings on contemporary history. Against this opinion Horst Denzer has asserted that Pufendorf certainly considered natural lawuniversally valid, but that it appeared in history in different ways. On the one hand, man can only show his will in actual situations and, on the other, his fundamental responsibility only shows if he has the possibility of a choice. Thus natural law will not be abstract demands on the individual but an actual law based in human social life and susceptible to historical change.^^ There are several explicit statements by Pufendorf to the effect that natural law is not ahlstorical and thus not applicable In the same way in all epochs. In other words, it materializes differently during the course of history. The question then Is how natural law is connected to history. It might be said that politics is the common ground to both fields of study. A connection exists between rational principles and observations and between the absolute and relative basis of natural law. Ultimately, a basic difference may be seen between these factors, but Denzer decidedly means that this interpretation is an anachronism, a modern way of thinking that does not belong in the 17th century. To consider natural law as a norm for judging history does not depend on whether it Is regarded as absolute or dependent on actual situations in a particular epoch. Closely connected to this line of reasoning is the question of whether Pufendorf has been objective and impartial in writing history. Assuming that a normexisted, it is possible that he used it in making judgments, as a standard of selecting data in a positive or In a negative sense or, finally, that he might have written his text in accordance with this norm. Meineckc p 286 ff. Hammerstein 1972 p 240 f. Idem, Samuel von Pufendorf. In M. Stolleis (ed), Staatsdenker im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a.M. 1977. p 185 f. Denzer p 232 ff. ibid, p 232 ff, 250 f.
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