PUFENDORF AND 18TH-CENTURY SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 129 It were to be wished that writers would guard against, as far as they can, involving very complex ideas under some short words and particles, which almost escape observation in sentences; such as, ought, should, as, according-, nay sometimes our English gerunds, is to be done, is to be preferred, and such like. Some writers treat the pronoun his, as if it were the sign of simple idea; and yet involve under it the complex ideas of property, and of a right to natural liberty. As the school-men made space and time to vanish into nothings, by hiding themin the adverbs when and where . . The applicability to the concept of the suumis obvious. “One’s own” should not be regarded as a simple, unproblematic notion. But not even here is there any explicit mention of Pufendorf. There is, in fact, to my knowledge only one place where Hutcheson expressly criticises him. This is in the inaugural lecture on man’s natural sociality.^® This lecture seems so far to have escaped the attention of scholars. In it, Hutcheson argues that there are in the human frame altruistic tendencies which cannot be reduced to or derived frommotives of self-interest. He mentions the Epicureans, Hobbes and Pufendorf as holding the opposite view.^^ What connection, if any, is there between a rejection of a rights theory and the rejection of psychological egoism? The former is a moral theory, the latter a theory of motivation. A tentative answer could be suggested along these lines: the principles governing the proper behaviour of the sovereign entities in the system of international law and politics constitute a rights theory in the sense here understood. Within this framework, it also holds that the very idea of genuine altruism seems to be unintelligible, or, if it is not unintelligible, at least it seems tobe irrelevant or objectionable. One may indeed ask oneself whether the notion of a sovereign state acting solely out of concern for the welfare of another (a concern not ultimately dictated by ulterior motives of self-interest) can make sense. And if it makes sense, such conduct would seem irrelevant or even objectionable: consider the example of a team in a sports competition which acts towards a competing team in a spirit of true sportsmanship, although this is not required by the rules of the game, and thereby reduces its own chances of success. A rights theory is merely concerned with considerations of justice, i.e. Hutcheson (1735) pp. 26—27; similarly in (1728) see III. “Sociality” had the same meaning as “altruism”, a word which at the time still had to await its invention. Compare for instance “. . . social or selfish” (Hutcheson (1735) p. 44) and Titius’s observation 78, 4 to 1, 3, 7: “. . . socialitas significat (1) finem Dei (2) aptitudinem alios amandi (3) actualem aliorumamorem.” Hutcheson (1730) pp. 10—11. Carmichael Suppl. II, ix, notes Titius’s view that socialitas is subordinated to philautia in Pufendorf, but does not commit himself. More recently, Diesselhorst p. 10 has rejected Welzel’s view that sociality is the basis for Pufendorf’s system: it is, he argues, rather self-preservation. Cf De jure ... 2, 3, 14. 2G 9
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