RB 73

summary 230 it provides a definition of the law a judge or lawyer must know in order to fulfil their professional requirements. By studying the principle jura novit curia in connection with this shift in Swedish legal methodology in the 19th century it becomes clear that the concept of law-in-force was used to define the scope of legal knowledge, as expressed by the principle. An important part of this knowledge was the ability to use the method of legal dogmatics inhard cases, in which no apparent legal solution could be identified. In such cases, the lawyers must create, or recreate the object of the study, law-in-force and thereby, fill gaps, eliminate overlaps and contradictions in order to render the legal system coherent and confirm its very existence. This thesis also demonstrates that the definition of legal knowledge, with regard to the principlejura novit curia, was an important factor behind the reformation of legal education in Sweden and to the increased professionalization of the judiciary in the 19th century. In line with this new concept of law and legal knowledge, the need for learned judges was stressed and the traditional use of lay judges in Swedish first instance courts was brought into question. Lastly, the investigation suggests, as predicted by the members of the Historical School, that the concept of law-in-force not only defines law, legal knowledge and therefore in a sense legal professional competence itself, but also the courts’ task as institutions within the state. In order to fulfil the demands for legality, stability and predictability in legal practice, courts had to conduct their legal investigations and limit their ratio decidendi to law-in-force. The legal arguments presented by the parties could only be considered valid to the extent that they corresponded to law-inforce. Hence, the parties’ right to influence the legal basis for a judgement was strongly limited through the application of the principle jura novit curia.

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