english summary 1085 (except Finland during the years of constitutional struggle). The basis can be found in the way the constitution was adopted, and it explains the independent constitutional interpretation of the justices in cases from recent years. Against this, it may be argued that the Norwegian judges have proven fairly loyal to the legislator during certain periods, such as 1918-1940 and 1948-1976 with Rt. 1970 p. 67 as a highlight. The years before 1975, there were many who assumed – not without reason – that judicial review had lost its significance, but that was refuted by the Supreme Court inRt. 1976 p. 1. The loyalty to the legislator has been a counter-force to constitutional critical judging, but such loyalty did not prevail to the extent that it completely eliminated constitutional critical judging. After Rt. 1976 p. 1, one could have expected a clarification and further development of the tripartite division which was established there – that individual rights should be protected with a higher degree of intensity than economic rights, which should in its turn be protected with a higher degree of intensity than the relationship between the legislative and executive organs of state. Admittedly, the division in these three parts has since been confirmed, but it is not quite easy to establish that it has been consistently applied. What is certain, however, is that the Norwegian Supreme Court applied theECHR, and the case-law of theECtHR, earlier than the Supreme Courts in the other Nordic countries (e.g. inRt. 1984 p. 1175). In light of what was set out above concerning the judicial culture of Norway, the comparison with Denmark and Sweden becomes obvious. The mere fact that Danish and Swedish judges in the 1920s and 1930s declared that they were able to exercise constitutional critical judging did not mean that such an approach had an impact in the courts’ caselaw during periods such as the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary, there were elements of legal culture that limited that possibility for judges. The clear loyalty to the legislator and the government of the Danish judges during both the 1880s and the 1940s shows the long lines and has been used as an explanation in the Danish discussion. The same applies to the weak constitutional tradition of the Swedish judges. With the exception of the protection of legality by a Swedish district judge in a well known case from the time of the Second World War, the Swedish, and the Danish, judges in the 20th century generally did not act in ahistoric, The other line of development after 1930: Constitutional critical judging on new foundations
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