extension, ontological subjectivism holds that it is only those objects that can be thought of in a specific logical manner that are real and exist, which is ultimately a demand for conceptual sufficiency, entailing that only those specific objects that are identical to the concept are real, while all other objects lack reality to a corresponding degree. Ultimately, this means that only concepts are real. Hence, ontological subjectivism entails that factual existence constitutes a factor invalidating any claims to reality proper.Despite the realistic traces in his philosophy,205 Hägerström cannot accept this idea, because for him there are no degrees of reality.The determination of reality is, just as existence, binary. Reality either is, or is not.The different types of reality that Hägerström, according to doctrine, experiments with, namely subjective reality and objective reality, are all equally real.206The difference is that subjective reality is indirect, it constitutes reality attained via objectively real objects, such as a thinking object (a subject), and subjective reality is real in the same manner as the concept of a straight line expresses indirect reality - in other words, reality expressed via a physical object. Neither example is less real than the objects to which they are attached are real, but they are real in different manners. Objective reality is identical to existence, while subjective reality depends upon the existence of an object sustaining reality.207 It is, however, only of the directly real things that existence can be predicated.208 In Hägerström’s later philosophy, existence, and reality are thus not identical concepts.They are concepts sharing one determination, which is determinateness. Neither the attribute’s existence nor reality can exist or be real if they are not selfp a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 3 98 205 For the different and conflicting interpretations of Hägerström’s theory of concepts, see, e.g., Cassirer, Hägerström, pp. 45-51. Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 230-232; MarcWogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, p. 120; Bjarup, “Axel Hägerströms filosofi, värdenihilism och rättspositivism,” Juridisk Tidskrift 16 (2004-05): p. 27. 206 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 15-17. Here Hägerström rejects the traditional idea of subjective reality, as the negation of objective reality. 207 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, p. 116; Petersson,Värdeteori, pp. 18-25. 208 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, p. 116; Petersson,Värdeteori, pp. 18-25.
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