In his analysis of Cartesian subjectivism, Hägerström concludes that the only possible solution to the epistemological dilemmas of Cartesian subjectivism was to postulate that the consciousness itself is real, and not merely imagined.171While subjectivism allows the identification of subject and object, Hägerström’s antisubjectivism assumes the opposite. According to Hägerström, if the consciousness of some object is not identical with this specific object itself, then the consciousness itself can become an object for knowledge. If this is the case then the consciousness itself exists as a definite that/this, and possesses existence as a definite thing rather than as an idea.172 Consequently, every possible content of mind is a determinate object of knowledge, rather than just being an imagined object of knowledge.173 The content of mind must thus constitute an object of knowledge and is also determinate in Hägerström’s meaning of the word as a definite that/this. Hägerström’s argument regarding the nature of the subject is not fully satisfactory, and needs clarification. A more consistent line of argumentation, proving the same conclusion, would be if Hägerström argued in the following manner: content of mind constitutes an object of knowledge, and in the capacity of such it exists, and by virtue of existence, the content of mind is determinate and thus real.This clarification is consistent with Hägerström’s general philosophy, because in other contexts the hub which Hägerström centers his discussion around is existence and what can be derived thereof.The reason for focusing on existence is that it is only from existence that the necessary determinations of reality can be deduced – that is, reality, determinateness, and self-identity.The reason to this conclusion is that every existing thing by necessity must be determinate, self-identical, and real, while it conversely needs not be the case that the determinate, self-identical, and real necessarily exists. However, it p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 3 88 171 Ibid., p. 329. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid.
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