monstrates to be at hand is the subject, not the necessity of subjects in general.The problem is that this particular existing subject can neither deduce the existence of any exterior reality nor deduce the existence of any external things merely on the basis of its own existence.155 Hägerström’s point is merely that it is merely subjectively, psychologically impossible that the subject itself should not exist. Objectively speaking, the universe, on the contrary could be devoid of all epistemological subjects without any ensuing contradictions or any loss of reality.The problem of metaphysics is that it rests upon a psychological interpretation of the world entailing that whatever corresponds to psychology is identical to reality, which facilitates the conclusion that psychological necessity carries over into ontological necessity or ontological causality, which finally entails subjectivism and solipsism.156 It is only from an epistemological point of view that the non-existence of subjects would constitute a total loss. From the ontological standpoint, the loss would be partial, and only encompass that specific class of objects called subjects. All in all, Hägerström’s point is that the subjectivistic standpoint is also founded upon the tacit assumption that there is only one idea that is impossible to conceive - namely, the concept of reality as not being identical with itself.157 Thus, the main principles of subjectivism, including subjective rationalism, are refuted. Hägerström’s conclusions in this have, however, been the subject of discussion.158 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 83 155 Cf. ibid. 156 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 23-34. 157 Hägerström, P. d.W., pp. 76-77. 158 See, e.g., Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 80-81;Wedberg, Filosofins historia, vol. 3: Från Bolzano till Wittgenstein, pp. 366-396.
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