derWissenschaft, we find that Bjarup’s conclusion is untenable.148 Hägerström’s Copernican Revolution starts out from the observation that it is impossible to disregard reality without ensuing contradictions, while on the other hand it is possible to disregard consciousness itself without contradictions.149 If one keeps this principle in mind it is impossible to understand how it can be argued that Hägerström’s Copernican Revolution entails a return to any kind of idealism. For where is the idealism in Hägerström’s ontological postulate? How can an ontological postulate eliminating the necessity of a subject cogently be said to involve idealism? In Selbstdarstellungen Hägerström repeats his ontological principle by demonstrating the identity between reality and determinateness, a determinateness that manifests itself in empirical knowledge such as a context in time and space.150 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 81 148 There are several further points where Bjarup description of Hägerström’s philosophy cannot be defended. For instance, by not drawing a distinction between the different meanings that can be attributed to Hägerström’s use of the term “real” Bjarup interprets Hägerström’s ontological definition of reality and existence as if it were idealistic.When Hägerström refers to reality, then the ontological requirement is non-contradiction, determinateness, which is ultimately a formal criterion, and when referring to existence the ontological requirement is self-identity, which is ultimately a material criterion. By not observing the distinction between formal and material, Bjarup confuses the two for one another, and as it happens claims that Hägerström makes reality a figment of imagination. See, e.g., Bjarup, Reason, pp. 276-277 and 435. 149 Hägerström, P. d.W., pp. 76-77; Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. 402.This is an exerciseof the mind concerning the ontological content of epistemology, it does not state that it is possible to disregard the consciousness, the subject in epistemological respects, for that would entail a logical impossibility as well as necessitating some kind of conceptual realism (purely objective and subject independent knowledge forms) in order to make knowledge possible at all. Cf. Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 8990. (Contains a letter from Axel Hägerström to Arnold Sölvén). 150 Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. 402.
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