of law, rather than their free dispensation of justice).12 If one looks at Hägerström’s scientific ideal, one easily understands the Uppsala School’s or Scandinavian Legal Realism’s following development towards a “realistic” legal theory. Hägerström’s incessant demand that legal science should and must use “real” methods as well as real concepts and notions in order to convey any scientific results might be (mis)understood or (mis)construed as being a demand for the inclusion of empirical research (sociological data) into jurisprudence. Hägerström never developed a realistic legal theory, in the sociological meaning based upon sociological methods and facts. The problem seems to be that his philosophical standpoint can be understood as a call for realism.13 The realistic interpretation of Hägerström is a mistake that is understandable if one disregards the fact that his critique of legal science was a philosophical critique concerning those premisses and methods of legal dogmatics that lead to unscientific results. This, however, did not mean that he necessarily equated unscientific results with them being empirically unverifiable results, that is, sociologically unverifiable results, a proposition’s scientific status might just as well be compromised by its formal deficiencies. Neither method can be substituted for another without jeopardizing the scientific foundations of each type of science respectively. Nevertheless, the two should be informed of the scientific results of one another. Incidentally, this understanding of the p a r t v i i i 656 12 Ross, Ret, p. 89. See especially Michael Martin’s illuminating analysis of the differences between sociological American Legal Realism and philosophical Scandinavian Legal Realism, in Martin, Legal realism,American and Scandinavian. See also Pennock; Hart,“Scandinavian Realism,”The Cambridge Law Journal (1959); Strömholm,“Scandinavian Realism,”European Review2 (1994). But, seeVerdross, Abendl. Rechtsph., pp. 183-184. Cf. Jarvad, “The Scandinavian Realism. A Critique. A Defence. A Restatement.,” pp. 21-26. 13 See, e.g., Helin, Lainoppi, pp. 432 and 435. Markku Helin defines Hägerström’s philosophy as a “defense of epistemological realism”; however, Helin simoultaneously asserts that this realism does not necessarily entail a demand for the inclusion of sociology into jurisprudence.
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