permeating doctrine and its propositions. Accordingly, the demand for reality does not entail a demand for the inclusion of sociological data into jurisprudence; hence, the method preferred is that of legal dogmatics.6 The Uppsala School originally only proposed a basic philosophical demand regarding the purity of formal argumentation in jurisprudence, but it was not, during this early period, an empirical movement nor, as has been said, an expression of philosophical realism.As a matter of fact, one must also take Hägerström’s strict separation of legal dogmatics from social psychology into consideration. InStat ochRätt Hägerström writes: p a r t v i i i 652 6 Cf. Helin, Lainoppi, p. 453. 7 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, p. 10. My translation. Swedish:“På grund häraf är det tydligt, att rättsdogmatiken för att göra idéer med rättsligt innehåll till föremål för undersökning förutsätter, att desamma verkligen i det hela genomföras som normer för mänskligt handlande inom den sfär, till hvilken de hänföra sig. Utan att i det hela genomföras sakna de nämligen praktiskt bestämningskraft. Och utan denna kraft sakna de förmåga att väcka lust till undersökning. Men lägg nu märke till, att om också rättsdogmatiken på detta sätt tager hänsyn till frågan, om rättsidéerna verkligen bli genomförda, så har den därför icke på minsta sätt till “On the basis of this, it is obvious that legal dogmatics, in order to make ideas with a legal content the object of examination, presupposes that they in general are implemented as norms for human behavior within that sphere to which they belong. If they are not generally implemented, they will lack a practical power of determination.And without this power they will also lack the power to arouse desire for an examination. But note that even if legal dogmatics in this manner really does pay attention to the question of whether or not the legal ideas are implemented, its task is still not to investigate those laws of nature that actually regulate this state of affairs. In this case, it is merely a question about the general premiss for legal dogmatics for it all to concern itself with its object.The previously mentioned investigation [regarding the laws of nature] is purely social psychological. Naturally, however, this sharp line drawn between a social psychological and a legal dogmatic investigation of law, only indicates that they a matter of principle should be methodologically separated, but by no means that they should not retain a rapport with each other.This does not need to be investigated any more than does the fact that aesthetic psychology and aesthetics, as they deal with the same object, although from different perspectives, properly speaking presuppose one another.”7
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=