that there exists no such category as natural law, is in full accordance with the fundamentals of Hägerström’s philosophy of science. Furthermore, the process of degeneration and demise characteristic of the development of natural law during the 19th Century helps explain Hägerström’s rejection of legal philosophy (the descendent of natural law) from the doctrine of sources, which also corresponds to the trends evident in the jurisprudence of the late 19th and early 20th Century, according to which the field of legally relevant legal science is narrowed down to legal dogmatics.1 One reason that explains Hägerström’s opinion is that legal philosophy lacks the material legitimacy needed for it to function as a source of law.This is a defect attributable to the failure of legal philosophy to take into account practical matters such as, for example, the issue of what a specific rule of law contains and how this specific rule is to be applied or taken into considerationwhen analyzing law.Characteristic of legal philosophy, according to Hägerström, is that it tends to treat law as if it were any other fact, and therefore fails to take the normative nature of law into proper consideration when analyzing law.This is an error in the formulation of a premiss that results in philosophical study of law lapsing into a study of legal policy-making rather than in jurisprudence.2 Hägerström’s characterization of legal philosophy and various other sciences of law, other than the dogmatic study of law and their relationships towards the law and its application, is a reflection of the theoretical general opinion of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.3 Accordingly, the contemporary late 19th and early a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 647 1 See, e.g., Bierling, Prinzipienlehre 5, pp. 1-56. 2 Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” passim. See also Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 1-33. 3 See, e.g., Gareis, Encyklopädie, pp. 9-12 and 196-206; Hagerup, “Nogle ord,” passim; Retsencyclopædi, pp. 34-41; Reuterskiöld, “Rättsnorm och rättsstridighet,” pp. iii-xvi; Bierling, Prinzipienlehre 5, passim.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=