To a certain extent, Hägerström’s philosophy and theory of science is what is generally called realistic, as it takes the agreement between the subjective and the objective elements of a judgment for granted, thus making the res the standard for objective knowledge. Hägerström’s ontology and epistemology applies the idea of the existence of correspondence between object and subject, and in the continuation, the correspondence between objective reality and objective knowledge thereof as being a real possibility of its superior premiss. From the ontological point of view, things and objects are invariably and necessarily self-identical. From an epistemological perspective, true knowledge of things and objects is correspondingly non-contradictory, that is, true knowledge does not predicate anything of the objects that necessitates a breach of the law of the excluded middle, tertium non datur.To postulate such a correspondence between subject and object, which borders on identity, naturally gives associations to classical metaphysical realism of concepts. When traditional metaphysics and Hägerström’s ideas are compared, decisive differences can be detected. Hägerström’s epistemology does not assume as conceptual, metaphysical realism does that there exists a qualified object of knowledge (which is the only object allowing the formulation of truly objective knowledge - the thing in itself) that the epistemological subject has the a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 641 Summary, Final Remarks, and Conclusions part v i i i phi losophy
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