the evaluation restricted to certain objective, that is positive, values as expressed in the positive sources of law? From a systematic point of view, the Interessenjurisprudenz denies that element of which the Begriffsjurisprudenz makes an ontological axiom of law, namely the completeness of the formal system of law.To the Interessenjurisprudenz gaps and lacunas are commonplace throughout the law and legislation.294 And these imperfections cannot be dismissed by reference to the fiction of the system of law as being a logically complete system of direct and definite, albeit hard to find, rules. On the contrary, these gaps can only be bridged by means of the judge’s investigation of the interests of society.295 From a scientific point of view, Hägerström’s opinion was that the historical investigation of the legislator’s intention, which the Interessenjurisprudenz advocates, is an aspect of interpretation that ought not to be overemphasized, as it fetters the interpretation and application of law to past interests rather than connecting it to the present.296 Therefore, by overemphasizing the historical aspect of interpretation, its relevant issues, namely contemporary relevance, become lost in historical ruminations, which also carry over to the practical utility of the Interessenjurisprudenz as a tool for the practicing jurist. At the beginning of the 20th Century, the so-called Freirechtsschule developed as a reaction to constructive jurisprudence.297 p a r t v i i , c h a p t e r 2 636 294 Heck, Grundriss des Schuldrechts, pp. 473-474 and 478-479;Wieacker, History, p. 453. 295 Heck, Grundriss des Schuldrechts, pp. 472-473. 296 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 16-42; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 74-105. See also Part VI, Chapter 8. 297 Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht, pp. 192-195; Muscheler, Relativismus und Freirecht: einVersuch über Hermann Kantorowicz, pp. e.g., 86-91 and173-174.; Schlosser, Grundzüge, pp. 241-243; Rüthers, Rechtstheorie, p. 352.About the intensity in the critique of the so-called constructive jurisprudence, also known as Begriffsjurisprudenz, see for instance Ernst Fuchs (1859-1929) who wished to putVoltaire’s “écrasez l’infame” to use in his fight against the anti-social dangers of the “pandektologischen und kryptosoziologischen Justizscholastik”, the “konstruktive Justizsophistik”, “die konstruktive wortgläubige Jurisprudenzkarrikatur” which according to Fuchs were 2 . 3. 2 di e fre i rechts schule
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