sence it is no better than natural law, especially not its theory of rights as protected interests.289 Under the aegis of Philipp Heck (1858-1943), who formulates his theory in strict opposition to the Begriffsjurisprudenz,290 the theory of interests developed in a subjective teleogical direction, where the primary interest to be adduced in interpretation of statutes is the balancing of interests performed by the legislator. The product is an interpretative theory aimed primarily at history, the historical interests of society and the legislator’s balancing of them.291 What is of interest is that while the Begriffsjurisprudenz is mostly concerned with the production of law under the shield of scientific objectivity,292 Interessenjurisprudenz is a theory concerned largely with the application of law.293 In comparison with the Begriffsjurisprudenz, the Interessenjurisprudenz emphasizes the evaluative elements of statute interpretation (which the Begriffsjurisprudenz construes as being a lower form of jurisprudence, insofar as it is preliminary to the jurisprudential construction, which is the higher form of jurisprudence). Hence, the Interessenjurisprudenz can be said to be realistic in the Hägerströmian sense of the word, in that it acknowledges that neither the interpretation nor the proper meaning of the law can be performed or ascertained without including a certain evaluative element.However, the question of legal positivism, in this respect, is which these evaluative elements should be.Whose values govern the interpretation, analysis, and application of law? Is the evaluation free, and the adduced values to be chosen freely, or is a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 635 289 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” pp. 81-82; “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 131-135; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 325-328. 290 See, e.g., Phillip Heck who first describes the19th Century theory, especially Jhering’s, and then its effects on modern jurisprudence. Heck, Grundriss des Schuldrechts, pp. 473-482. 291 Ibid., pp. 472-473. 292 See HeinzWagner, who argues that the whole School of Pandectists only helped cast the social and economical realities of 19th Century Germany in legal forms, by, e.g., creating new concepts of law or by providing already existing rules of added legitimacy.Wagner, Die politische Pandektistik, passim. 293 Wieacker, History, pp. 454-455; Schlosser, Grundzüge, pp. 241-243.
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