An immediate reaction to the Begriffsjurisprudenz was Jhering’s own,which came in the 1870s when he wrote Der Zweck im Recht (1877-1883), and disassociated himself from the Begriffsjurisprudenz with which he was so closely associated. In Der Zweck im Recht, he presented an alternative to the Begriffsjurisprudenz, namely the Interessenjurisprudenz.According to Der Zweck im Recht, law is created and developed by the so-called ends of the law, or the law’s telos, most readily expressed by the competing interests within a society (the individual’s, the state’s, and society’s).286 According to this theory, the law is an organ of the most compelling kind and operates in the justified interests of society (objective teleology).Therefore, whenever a difficult case of law legal policy is addressed, jurists must solve such problems by reference to the end or telos of the law.This in turn corresponds to the prevailing interests of law, rather than to a direct application of the concepts of law, according to which the case is syllogistically fitted into its proper place in the system.287 Though initially Hägerström appears to be rather sympathetic to Jhering’s sociologically influenced theory,288 he later turns and decides that in esp a r t v i i , c h a p t e r 2 634 2.3 Late 19th and early 20th Century developments 1. 3. 1 inte re s senjuri sprudenz 286 Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, 4 ed. 371 ff from:Ahlander, Om rätt och rättstillämpning: studier i juridikens idéhistoria och rättstillämpningens teori, p. 83; Deutsche und Europäische Juristen, Schröder and Kleinheyer, eds., Jhering. 287 See Ahlander, Rätt och rättstillämpning, pp. 82-85; Deutsche und Europäische Juristen, Schröder and Kleinheyer, eds., Jhering. 288 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 30-32.
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