structive ideas implied that jurisprudence had a mandate to intervene in legal causality in any matter that lacked support in the positive sources of law, and doing so either, or both, through the creation of new legal facts and consequences as well as through the rearrangement of relationships between existing legal facts and consequences. Even though Jhering himself abandoned this over-positivistic school of jurisprudence,277 the effects of his theory seem to have lingered on in the civil law family of jurisprudence for more than a half Century after the original formulation of his ideas.278 One might even ask whether these ideas have yet to subside from legal science. Despite differences with regard to the status and direct validity of jurisprudence as a source of law, the doctrine of statute interpretation of the Begriffsjurisprudenz, as well as its analogous application to sources of law other than statute law, is almost identical to that of the Historical School.279 According to Bernhard Windscheid, who himself never abandoned the ideas of Begriffsjurisprudenz, the direct difference between the exegesis and interpretation of a statute and the scientific treatment of law is that interpretation is: “… wissenschaftliche Behandlung, schon die niedere, welche den Sinn der vom Gesetzgeber gebrauchtenWorte, um so mehr die höhere, welche den eigentlichen Gedanken eines Rechtssatzes oder eines Rechtsganzen bestimmt.”280 Hence, a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 631 277 Jhering, Scherz und Ernst in der Juristprudenz: eineWeinachtsgabe für das juristische Publikum, passim. See also Hägerström’s analysis inStat och rätt, p. 30, where Hägerström describes Jhering as one of several sociologically influenced legal scientists who emphasizes that the binding character of law, in all its forms, depends upon a connection with society for its existence, which is a radically different standpoint from what Jhering represented in his youth. See alsoWilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 88.128. However, Philipp Heck (Heck, “Die Begriffsjurisprudenz,” pp. 191-200) held that Jhering never really parted from the ideas and theories of his youth, and that Jhering’s theory of interests merely comprised Jhering’s nominal substitution of one for the other, whereby no material changes in Jhering’s method were implemented. 278 E.g., Björne, Den nordiska rättsvetenskapen 3, pp. 208-460. 279 See, e.g., Jhering, Geist 1, pp. 385-389;Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, pp. 50-59. 280 Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, p. 59.
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