that: “Unter Gewohnheitsrecht versteht man dasjenige Recht, welches, ohne vom Staate gesetzt worden zu sein, thatsächlich geübt wird.”241 Notwithstanding the scientific renaissance that the study of Roman law underwent during the 19th Century, the Historical School’s ideas of how the study of the Pandects should be properly performed, under the aegis of Puchta, were transformed and took a more formalistic and less organic direction than that according to Savigny and Stahl.242 A typical example of this formalization of legal science is Puchta’s doctrine of sources, which undeniably emphasizes customary law, but does so while simultaneously providing scientific law with a specific form of validity, thus breaking up the unity of law by differentiating the Wissenschaftliches Recht from the Juristenrecht and Volksrecht. According to Puchta’s doctrine of sources, a distinction is to be made between sources of law having external validity (such as customary law and legislation) and those sources of law whose validity is internal, that is, founded not upon the will of the people or legislator, but upon the validity of scientific demonstration, its truth value.243 Accordingly, scientific law was redefined in a more formal direction - in a logical and system-dependent direction - than the legal science outlined by the early Historical School.244 Consequently, private law jurisprudence, on account of its internal authority, found reason to consider itself to have the direct authority to produce new law, thus indicating that the scientific development and production of law is a discourse distinct from the popular development and production of law.245 For while the popular production of law bases its authority upon the agreement between the law and an undefined form of popp a r t v i i , c h a p t e r 2 622 241 Ibid., p. 38. 242 Haferkamp, Puchta, pp. 281-287. Cf. Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 82-83 and 86-87. 243 Puchta, Gewohnheitsrecht I, pp. 166-167; Gewohnheitsrecht II, pp. 15-21;Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 74-80;Wieacker, History, p. 317. 244 Wieacker, History, pp. 317-319. 245 Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 70-87.
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