school as constituting a school construing the concepts of law as being autonomously real in relation to the reality of the rules of positive law, which in turn entails that the existence of the rules of positive law are explained with reference to their superior systematic concept.226 So rather than explaining the construction (and ensuing existence) of the legal concepts themselves inductively, the concepts are explained with respect to their genus proximum, thereby explaining the positive rules of law and their corresponding actual realities deductively. Seen from a practical point of view, the difference is that while natural law due to its non-historical and arbitrary selection of sources of law, lacked national and similar validity and applicability, Pandectism and the Begriffsjurisprudenz were strictly positivistic and nation-bound with respect to their collection of sources.227 It is with respect to the nature of the validity and reach of their conclusions that they might be called non-positivistic, as these conclusions, despite their ostensible exclusion of social, political, and economical considerations, tended to transcend the purely legal discourse.228 Irrespective of how exaggerated and extreme was the newfounded belief in deductive methodology (taken together with their blind faith that the methods characteristic for the advanced of natural sciences could be transferred to legal science), and its overestimation of the necessary advantages and good that a formalistic construction of legal concepts and the system of law a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 619 prudenz, its method and notion of system: Haferkamp, Puchta, pp. 78-101. Cf.Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 7-15 et passim. 226 See Jhering, Geist der römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, vol. 2:II, pp. 400-405. 227 Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft, pp. 266-269. See, e.g., BernhardWindscheid’s enumeration of the sources of Pandektenrecht, namely, Roman law (in particular Justinian’s Code), Canonistic law, German legislation, and German customary law (including popular custom and practices, legal practice, and the learned opinion). See Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, vol. 1, pp. 7-14. 228 See, e.g.,Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, pp. 121-156. For a brief discussion about, on one hand, the politics of private law jurisprudence, and on the other, the clearly political aspirations of the construction of a common German public law as created by jurisprudence). See alsoWieacker, History, pp. 346-349.
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