monistic, for even if it is customary to speak of rational law in parallel to positive law, rational law only gains reality through positive law,197 whereupon: “Es kann daher kein anderes Recht geben als ein positives, bestehendes; Recht und positives Recht sind gleichbedeutende Begriffe.”198 In addition, Stahl demonstrates that the fundamentals of rationalism cannot stand up to logical scrutiny, as on the one hand, they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of natural law as an object, and on the other, fail to provide a valid description of the causal relationship existing between natural law (an eternal, universal, and unitary cause) and positive law (a temporal, particular, and diversified effect).199 This conclusion furthermore strengthens Stahl’s assertion that the idea of a dualism in law, that natural law exists autonomously in relation to positive law, is a pipedream, for: “Naturrecht fordert positive Berechtigung des Individuums, und fordert daß sie aus einem Vernunftgesetze hervorgehe; wie dieses aber möglich sey ist nicht zu begreifen.”200 Stahl continues, for even if these contradictions of natural law only affect the scientific discourse, natural law itself gives birth to contradictions and conflicting interests. For the claims of universality commonly attached to the concepts of natural law, such as, for instance, liberty andequality taken together are incompatible. One person’s liberty is invariably at the expense of someone else’s equality and vice versa.201 What Stahl points to is the incompatibility of natural law with facts. It is on account of such incongruities in natural law, especially the incompatibility between natural law and the facts of life, that Stahl (as with the rest of the Historical School) redefines legal science: p a r t v i i , c h a p t e r 2 614 197 Stahl, Phil. d. Rechts 2.1, pp. 143-144. 198 Ibid., p. 144. However, as of lately the legal positivism of the Historical school, especially the theory of Friedrich Julius Stahl, has been as been described as being a version of protestant Natural law. Bjarup, “Professor Peterson om naturrätt, historiska skolan och Stahl,”Juridisk Tidskrift 16 (2004-05): p. 504. 199 Stahl, Phil. d. Rechts 1, pp. 173-189. 200 Ibid., p. 188. 201 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
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